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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLIVE H. PRESTON, \ 
Plaintiff and AppeUant, ( 
-vs-
GEORGE. P. LAMB and T. J. SPEROS, ( 
Def end.ants and Respovndents. J 
Case No. 
11001 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
THE HONORABLE MERRILL C. FAUX, 
DISTRICT JUDGE. 
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WORSLEY SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor Continental 
Bank Building 
Salt !Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Def end.ants 
and Respondents 
MABEY, BRADFORD & 
MARSDEN 
1700 University Club Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellwnt 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OL,IVE H. PRESTON, 
Plaintiff and AppellMtt, 
-vs-
GEORGE P. LAMB and T. J. SPEROS, 
Defendarnts and Respo'Yldents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11001 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff when she fell in the defendants' restaurant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted defendants' Motion for 
8ummary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is incorrect. The 
material facts are these: 
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George P. Lamb is the owner of Lamb's Grill Cafe 
at 169 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. He has 
been in the restaurant business for 49 years, 28 at 
thiR location. (Deposition of Margaret E. Stoll, et al., 
pp. 13, 14.) 
On December 2.t, 196..Jo, Plaintiff, an employee of 
Standard Optical Company, 155 South Main Street, 
accompaniPd by Gerald G. Hugentobler, walked to Lamb's 
for a cup of coffee. It had just started to sprinkle. 
1 DPposition of Plaintiff, p. 11). Since they were not 
wearing coats, Plaintiff walked next to the buildings 
nnd under Lamb's marquee. (Deposition of Plaintiff, 
p. 12; Deposition of Hugentobler, p. 6; Deposition of 
Stoll, et al., p. 44). 
Plaintiff walked through an outside door, across 
a vestibule, through an inside door and took five or six 
steps across the linoleum floor of the caf e. When 10 to 
12 feet into the cafe, she fell. (Deposition of Plaintiff, 
p. 1B; Deposition of Hngentohler, pp. 6, 7, 13). 
The floor where Plaintiff fell was clean and dry. 
rrhere was no water or foreign material on it. It was 
highly polished and shiny. (Depositions of Stoll, et al., 
pp. G, 7, 24, 29; Deposition of Plaintiff pp. 14, 18; Depo-
t.;ition of Hugentobler p. 7). The vestibule was also dry. 
There have been no other accidents. (Deposition of Stoll, 
(•t al. p. 2-1-) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Rather than follow the format of the Appellant's 
Brief which sets up four issues, the Defendants will dis-
<·uss the only real issue before the court, that is, whether 
the affidavits, depositions and answers to interroga-
tories, setting forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, show that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Rule 56. It is the position of the Defendants that they 
do not. 
This suit was commenced May 24, 1966, about a year 
and a half after the accident. At that time the Plaintiff 
claimed that she fell "due to the negligence of Defend-
nnts in allowing the floor of [their] place of business to 
liecome unsafe through the accumulation of snow, water 
and slush on said floor ... " (R. 1). After the depositions 
of the plaintiff, Defendant Lamb, his employees Marga-
rrt E. Stoll, Rose Timmins and James H. Lee, and the 
eompanion of the plaintiff, Gerald G. Hugentobler, had 
lie en taken (there being no other witnesses), Defendants 
filed Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.17). 
After a full hearing on April 21, 1967, before the 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, District Judge, it appeared 
without any dispute whatever that there was no snow, 
no water and no slush on the floor. Accordingly, the 
~fotion was granted hnt with l<'ave to amend. (R. 20). 
On May 19, 1967, the Plaintiff filrd an Amended 
Complaint in which Defendants were charged with negli-
gence "in the manner and procedure of waxing and care 
of the floor ... in applying exr1•ssive amounts of wax 
and in maintaining a highly waxed, buffed and polished 
floor which was unusually slippery ... " and in main-
taining a floor "without any runner, caqwt, wipe-up 
mat or other floor rovering on a snowy, rainy, wet day 
." (R. 22, 23). 
Dt>fendants r<>newed tlwir Motion for Rumary .J ndg-
nwnt. It was heard on .JunP 28, 1967, and was grantPd 
on A ugnst 22, 1967. (R. 32). 
At tlw hearing upon thr Secon ~lotion for Smmnary 
.Tndgment, tlH• Plaintiff adoptPd her third \'<'rs:on of 
the aecident. In hpr Amended Complaint she ahamlom•d 
snow, ·watPr and slush and eharge<l that tlwre was too 
much wax on the floor. At tlw h<->aring, howPVPI', as in 
lit-'l' Brief, she rhargecl that tlwre was not enough \n1X 
on the floor. (RriPf, p. 9). 
These arc> not alternative statenwnts of a rlaim. 
ThPse are inconsistent, contradictory statements of the 
facts upon which the claim is hasPd. The court properly 
granted tlw Motion for Smrnmuy .JudgmPnt and t<•rn1!n-
ntPd this litigation. 
\Vaxing a floor is 11ot 1wgligern·e. Gaddis I'. Ladies 
J,if('rrtnf Cl11l1, -1- rtnh :2<1 Ul, :288 P. :.!cl 783 (19;}3). \Yhat 
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evidence is there here of e~cessive amounts of wax or 
wax negligently applied¥ Only the statement attributed 
to waitress Margaret Stoll, "That floor is awfully slip-
pery, Olive. They waxed it last night." (Deposition of 
Plaintiff, p. 14). 
Assume this to he true, it does not show negligence. 
This was the proof in Gaddis. There is no dispute that 
Defendants use a commercial non-skid wax. There is 
no suggestion that the manner of application employed 
hy the maintenance man Lee was improper (Deposition 
of Stoll, et al., pp. 36-40). Indeed, if the affidavit of 
Douglas MacGregor is to be considered, the more wax 
the better. 
Nor is there even a scintilla of evidence that there 
should have been a mat on the floor. This floor was dry 
hy the admission of everyone. At the risk of belaboring 
the obvious ,in Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 
:11, ~:12 P. 2d 210 (1%1), relied npon hy plaintiff, the 
!'all orcurred on WPt terrazzo at the entrance to the store. 
In De 1-Vee..,.e v. J. C, Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P. 
2cl 898 ( 1956), also relied upon by Plaintiff, the fall 
ncrurred in the entrance to the store. The floor was 
wPt and had muddy tracks upon it. 
Here the Plaintiff argues that her shoes must have 
hec>n wet. Is that the responsibility of the Defendants~ 
If ordinary care requires mats over interior dry, clean 
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linoleum during inclement weather, then such floors are 
not suitable for businesses in this climate. Furthermore, 
what is the authority for the assertion that everyone 
knows wet leather is more slippery than dry leather. 
Most bowlers are careful to keep their soles dry so that 
their feet will slide. 
The position ultimately taken by the Plaintiff was 
that the Defendants did not properly maintain the floor. 
rrhe charge is that a "dry" mop was ust>d rather than a 
"trPatPd" mop. This was madP thP foundation for an Plah-
orat0 house of cards constructed by Douglas l\lacGregor. 
DPf<"ndants ohjectPd to th:s affidavit. It is subject to 
several deficiencies. 
Even though the floor of the Defendants' restaurant 
has not been modified since the accident occurred and 
was available for inspection at any time, Douglas Mac-
(}regor made no tests of the floor. Instead, he used a 
f'ample floor "artificially aged" with "synthetic dirt", 
whatev<>r that is, rolling the dirt in with "a smooth, 
rubber-faced 50 pound roller." (R. 26). 
None of these conditions are even suggested to pre-
vail at Lamb's Grill Cafe. Nor does it appear that the 
Plaintiff's shoe is the standard. 
J~xperiments or tests are not admissible without a 
~liowing of similarity of ronditions. 32 C .. T.S. 723 (Evi-
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dence, Section 590, Similarity of Conditions). All Mac-
Gregor's experiments shows is the co-efficient of friction 
between the sample floor and the Plaintiff's shoe. This 
E'ays nothing about the Defendants' floor. 
But even if sweeping with a broom or dry mop makes 
the floor less skid-proof, what would have been the 
result of identical tests by MacGregor using a treated 
dust mop. Without such a comparison, the relationship 
between the dry mop and the floor's slippiness js un-
known and the question of proximate cause is left unan-
swered. 
Our final comment on treated dust mops. If liability 
in this case is to depend on whether dusting is done with 
a dry or treated mop, the user of the wax should in all 
fairness be informed of what the mop should be treated 
with and the effect of using a dry mop. The lable is in 
no sense in the context of a warning to the user. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff complains that summary judgment is 
a drastic action and is not favored. However, she has 
hPen given the opportunity of presenting this case in 
tlm~e different factual frameworks and under none has 
:-\Ii<' shown any evidence of negligence. 
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The maintenance procedures of Defendants seem to 
rise above ordinary care. Although the Plaintiff in her 
Amended Complaint charged excessive amounts of wax, 
she now says, too little wax, too infrequently applied. 
Unless the law has reached the point where it is negli-
gence not to wax floors, the Summary Judgment in favor 
of Defendants should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondents 
Seventh Floor Continental 
Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
